(7975.88.72) Updates on Euclid's theorem
#proof-theory #philosophy-of-math
In recent work, Pistone proposes a category-theoretic notion of proof identity for first- and second-order natural deduction that relies on the characterization of natural deduction rules as natural transformations between functors arising from . In particular, he conjectures these rules give rise to natural transformations on precisely
This notion of equivalence is extended in this note, by introducing Sieg's notion of "lemmas-as-rules" in his natural formalization framework; we claim that the notion of proof identity arising from viewing lemmas-as-rules as natural transformations conforms more closely to a mathematician's informal notion of proof identity, and indeed yields coherent notions of identity, reduction, simplicity, and purity between (some) informal mathematical proofs, making headway toward the use of categorical techniques to solve Hilbert's 24th problem. We will provide a case study for this second point with the use of three proofs of Euclid's theorem that there are infinitely many primes.
The basic idea, by which we will claim that these three proofs are related, is as follows:
- Find a common "proof skeleton" in which each proof fits. This proof skeleton will be expressed as a partial natural deduction derivation using "lemmas-as-rules" in the style of Sieg's intercalation calculus.
- Writing the schematic formulae in this proof skeleton as parametric formulas, we will express each step of the proof skeleton as a functor from
to . - The natural deduction rules and lemmas-as-rules applications will be natural transformations precisely when we consider those proofs that fit into the proof skeleton as equivalent. In other words, the quotient category obtained by the quotient of
by the proof skeleton is the full subcategory of on which the lemmas-as-rules and natural deduction rules furnish natural transformations.
The case study in question is Euclid's theorem, that there are infinitely many primes. In 1955, Harry Furstenburg gave a "topological" argument for this result. It is paraphrased as follows:
We introduce a topology into the space of integers S, by using the arithmetic progressions (from
to ) as a basis. It is not difficult to verify that this actually yields a topological space...Each arithmetic progression is closed as well as open, since its complement is the union of other arithmetic progressions (having the same difference). As a result the union of any finite number of arithmetic progressions is closed. Consider now the set , where consists of all multiples of , and runs through the set of primes . The only numbers not belonging to are and , and since the set is clearly not an open set, cannot be closed. Hence is not a finite union of closed sets which proves that there are an infinity of primes.
Several authors {Mercer, Conrad} have claimed that Furstenburg's proof is not fundamentally topological, in that it does not use any topological results beyond the basic definitions of a topological space. Idris Mercer gives a "variant of" Furstenburg's proof which is devoid of topological language, using only basic properties of sets and prime numbers to demonstrate the "'real reason' that Furstenburg's approach works."
Conrad goes further, claiming that Furstenburg's proof is "based on the same idea as Euclid's proof of the infinitude of primes." It is therefore desirable to extract the underlying idea that these mathematicians reference; we will use three proofs of this theorem as a case study to provide support for a rigorous way of comparing informal mathematical proofs based on their "underlying ideas," with a view towards a precise notion of proof-theoretic simplification and methodological purity. My conception is based on the notion of equivalence with respect to natural formalization framework introduced by Sieg, but it extends this notion to account for a reduction relation between proofs, rather than simple equivalence. Furthermore, I aim to unify this account with Pistone's equivalence of natural deduction proofs up to free permutation via natural transformations; with a similar set of naturality constraints on the mappings induced by Sieg's lemmas-as-rules as Pistone introduced for the usual natural deduction rules, we obtain a richer notion of equivalence that better captures informal notions of equivalence between mathematical proofs.
Sieg considers naturally formalized proofs to be equivalent if they each arise via direct substitutions into a fixed proof schema: we extend this to an ordering relation on naturally formalized proofs when they coincide in the same sense at some level of generality. That is, applications of lemmas-as-rules in the natural formalization framework generate nested subgoals that are filled by further applications of lemmas-as-rules and natural deduction rules: roughly, we will say that a naturally formalized proof
The idea is that these proofs
This tree
Here is a natural formalization (given in Gentzen natural deduction style rather than Fitch style for convenience) of each of the three proofs, at the top level of generality.
Furstenburg
with the following predicates and definitions:
We have also made use of the following lemmas-as-rules:
Mercer
with the following lemmas-as-rules:
so
Euclid
where for any set of integers
with the following lemmas-as-rules:
so that
The key intuition is the similarity between the lemmas-as-rules: while some of the